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This aim of this paper was to explore commonalities between HIV/AIDS related conditions, 
obesity and other disabling impairments as health-related barriers that limit opportunity and 
advancement in society and the workplace. Taking a number of examples from original 
fieldwork and European Union and United Kingdom law, we posit that ‘disability 
discrimination’ under European Union law remains an indefinite, imprecise and incomplete 
area that requires greater alignment with the social model of disability. The principle 
attributes of societal discrimination towards people living with HIV and obese people are that 
these conditions are perceived to be primarily or in some instances, solely caused by 
controllable factors related often to behaviours and lifestyle choices. Strong beliefs that these 
conditions are controllable, is perceived as a justification and in some instances 
encouragement for the creation of stigma and discriminative behaviours that are unjust and 
uninformed. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, this paper postulates how and why 
stigma exists towards both individuals with disabilities and also obese individuals and people 
living with HIV; second, reviews the legal framework on disability discrimination in both 
United Kingdom and European Union courts that are directly relevant to the concepts of 
obesity and HIV-AIDS; third, presents critical thoughts as to the extent to which emerging 
decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning obesity and HIV-AIDS 
accord with the social model of disability; and fourth, offers an analysis of the implications of 
the United Kingdom and European framework and suggests possible interventions in this 
area. .   
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Introduction 
 Over time the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and obesity has increased worldwide. It is 
estimated that 35 million people worldwide have HIV/AIDS and 600 million people are 
obese (World Health Organisation, 2014, 2015). Thus, HIV/AIDS and obesity are conditions 
of current concern with increasing prevalence and concomitant rise in stigma towards 
members both groups. The focus on HIV/AIDS and obesity reflects current academic and 
policy debates that highlight the potential of stigma to dilute the effectiveness of 
interventions in these areas. Both conditions have received the attention of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in relation to cases concerning disability.   
 This aim of this paper was to explore commonalities between HIV/AIDS related 
conditions, obesity and other disabling impairments as health-related barriers that limit 
opportunity and advancement in society and the workplace. Taking a number of examples 
from original fieldwork and European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) case law, we 
posit that ‘disability discrimination’ under EU law remains an indefinite, imprecise and 
incomplete area that requires greater alignment with the social model of disability. In order to 
address this assertion, the paper is divided into four sections. First, this paper postulates how 
and why stigma exists towards both people with disabilities and also obese individuals and 
people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHA); second, the paper reviews the legal framework in 
relation to disability discrimination in primarily UK and EU courts of direct relevance to 
obesity and HIV/AIDS; third, presents critical thoughts as to the extent to which emerging 
decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning obesity and HIV/AIDS 
accord with the social model of disability; and fourth, offers an analysis of the implications of 
the UK and EU legal framework and suggests possible interventions in this area.   
 
  
Formation of stigma 
 In western societies the formation of negative attitudes and stigmatisation of obesity 
and HIV/AIDS appear to be dissimilar. One of the main sources that contributes to obesity 
stigma is the media exemplified by the commonality of fat jokes and derogatory portrayal of 
obese people (e.g., Flint, Hudson & Lavallee, 2016; Puhl & Brownell, 2001). In contrast, 
HIV/AIDS is considered a taboo topic that receives little media coverage and the 
stigmatisation and stereotyping of PLHA is typically considered an unacceptable topic for 
comedic response. Obesity stigma is a topic that is often reinforced and in many instances 
appears to be endorsed. For example, Flint et al. (2016) reported that UK national newspapers 
contained derogatory portrayals of obesity, including the stereotyping of obese people as 
slothful and gluttonous and there was no evidence to suggest that stigmatising and 
discriminatory behaviour is frowned upon. HIV/AIDS does not receive the same media 
coverage and whilst obesity stigma is reinforced to the recipient, there is a dearth of academic 
evidence for the stigmatisation of HIV/AIDS in the media. Mass media campaigns relating to 
HIV/AIDS are typically directed towards awareness-raising and there have been calls for 
campaigns to address stigmatising attitudes and stereotypes in the general population 
(Maharjan et al., 2008). 
 Previous research (e.g., Flint, Hudson & Lavallee, 2015) has demonstrated that 
obesity stigma is evident in diverse population groups measured on both a conscious and 
unconscious level. As such, obesity stigma has been reported in various settings such as 
schools, healthcare and workplaces (Flint, 2015; Flint & Snook, 2014; Flint, Čadek, 
Codreanu, Ivić, Zomer, & Gomoiu, 2016). Obesity stigma research has demonstrated that 
there is an association between attitudes towards obese people and beliefs about the 
controllability of obesity. Thus, if an individual believes that obesity is controllable (i.e., 
caused by unhealthy consumption and inactivity) is it likely that they will form negative 
attitudes towards obese people. This is the result of an ability to assign blame to obese people, 
whereas an individual who believes that obesity is uncontrollable (i.e., genetically influenced) 
is less likely to form negative attitudes towards obese people. Likewise, previous research 
(Seacat et al., 2007) has demonstrated that beliefs about the controllability of HIV/AIDS (e.g., 
contracted through unprotected sex) rather than uncontrollable causes (e.g., contracted at 
birth) are also likely to influence negative attitudes towards HIV-AIDS people. One 
explanation for HIV/AIDS and obesity stigmatisation is Attribution Theory (Weiner, 1995), 
which postulates that individuals' beliefs about controllability influence subsequent actions. 
Thus,  when HIV/AIDS and obesity are believed to be controllable, it is likely that an 
individual will develop negative attitudes towards HIV/AIDS and obese people through an 
ability to assign blame. Alternatively, individuals who believe that there are uncontrollable 
causes of HIV-AIDS and obesity are less likely to develop negative attitudes towards PLHA 
and obese people. The attribution of HIV/AIDS and obesity to causes believed to be under a 
person's control has consistently been reported as a factor leading to stigmatisation. This has 
also been evidenced in research reporting on self-stigmatisation (e.g., Flint et al., 2015; Mak, 
Poon, Pun, Cheung, 2007).  
 We posit that the relationship between HIV/AIDS and obesity with disability 
discrimination are societal and workplace issues. Within society and the workplace, citizens 
are expected to respect the importance of preventing discrimination against others with a 
possible disabling characteristic (e.g., impairments to understanding, hearing, sight and 
mobility). Responsible societies and citizens prohibit and prevent discriminatory behaviours 
and practices especially against those with disabling characteristics, for example mental 
impairments to reasoning or physical impairments. However, in the case of HIV/AIDS and 
obesity, society and citizens may be unaware of stereotyping and stigmatisation of others that 
emanates from our knowledge deficits about HIV/AIDS, and obesity as defined by Body 
Mass Index (BMI). 
 Legal regulation prohibits discriminatory activities and encourages responsible 
societies, citizens and its workplaces to promote the inclusion of others with disabling 
conditions by using non-discriminatory practices and language. However, where the law is 
inadequate and/or inflexible, PLHA or obese people have the potential to be subjected to 
stereotyping, stigmatization and discrimination with no concomitant legal remedy available. 
What are the implications for society, its citizens and workplaces if anti-discrimination laws 
cannot be employed to challenge discriminatory language, practices and stigmatising 
behaviours towards PLHA or obese people purely because they are not viewed as the 
potential subjects of discrimination or as disabled? Where can discriminatory behaviour be 
checked and reversed; how can law and society accommodate PLHA and those with obesity 
issues within the parameters of disability discrimination; how can stigmatizing practices in 
relation to HIV/AIDS and obesity be similarly challenged in order to maintain compatibility 
with other areas of anti-discrimination provisions in order to eradicate societal and workplace 
disability discrimination claims? These are key questions that face legislators, citizens and 
the courts.  
 
The UK and EU legal Framework 
  Non-discrimination law is symmetrical meaning that it protects both the 
majority/advantaged group and the minority/disadvantaged group from discrimination 
(Waddington, 2015). For example, the consequence of this is that gender equality law protects 
both men and women within the workplace from discrimination reflected in EU and UK law 
(see Directive (EC) 2006/54 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and 
equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) and the 
Equality Act 2010 respectively). However, disability non-discrimination law is generally 
asymmetrical in nature meaning that it only protects individuals with disabilities from 
discrimination. In addition, non-disabled people who receive adverse treatment in comparison 
with a person with a disability have no right,  to claim that they have experienced 
discrimination on the grounds of disability. 
The liberal conception of formal equality is one of consistency, thus likes must be 
treated alike (Barnard & Hepple, 2000). This reinforces the basic Aristotelian principle and 
forms the basis of our ideas about equality (Fredman, 2011). Yet this approach does not take 
into account the fact that there may be material differences between the two groups being 
compared so that without more substantive action, real equality is not achieved (Sargeant, 
2008). To counter this, non-discrimination law in relation to individuals with disabilities 
employs the concept of reasonable accommodation at the EU level (Employment Equality 
Directive 2000/78/EC) and the duty to make reasonable adjustments at the UK level (s.20 
Equality Act 2010). Only individuals who are defined as “disabled” for the purposes of the 
law are granted such rights and it is consequently crucial to examine the legal framework in 
order to ascertain how the concept of disability is defined. 
 The starting point in relation to a consideration of the legal framework prohibiting 
disability discrimination within the UK is the Equality Act 2010 (EA 2010). For the sake of 
clarity this article uses the term “UK” as the territorial scope of the EA is surprisingly 
complex and a full discussion is beyond the remit of this article. In terms of scope, the EA 
covers Great Britain (England, Wales and, with a few exceptions, Scotland) but apart from a 
few provisions not Northern Ireland which has transferred powers from Westminster on the 
areas of equal opportunities and discrimination. In Northern Ireland, the intention is to leave 
it to employment tribunals to determine whether the law applies 'depending for example on 
the connection between the employment relationship and Great Britain' (Explanatory Notes to 
the Equality Act 2010, para. 15). The EA 2010 is the means by which the UK gives effect to 
its obligations under both EU and international law. The EA 2010 contains a number of 
protected characteristics at section 4 namely age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage 
and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; and finally 
sexual orientation. The definition of disability is provided at section 6 which states: 
 
“(1) A person (P) has a disability if— 
(a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and 
(b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to 
carry out normal day-to-day activities.” 
 
 This definition accords very much with the medical model of disability which locates 
disability within the individual. Thus, disability is a medical condition and consequently like 
all other conditions, can be treated by doctors to ensure that its symptoms are alleviated or 
eradicated (Oliver, 1996; Beaumont, 1996; Drimmer, 1992; Parsons, 1958). Yet, the EA 
2010’s adoption of a medical definition fails to appreciate the often-subtle interplay between 
society, discrimination and individuals with disabilities. This is best illustrated by the EA 
2010's requirement that any impairment must affect the individual’s ability to undertake 
normal day-to-day activities. Thus, Guidance issued by the Secretary of State under the EA 
2010 clarifies that activities do not fall within the category of 'normal day-to-day' if they are 
normal only for a particular person or group. Indeed, Goodwin v Patent Office (1999) 
confirmed that: 
 
“What is a day-to-day activity is best left unspecified: easily recognised, but defined 
with difficulty. Thus, it is not directed to the person's own particular circumstances, 
either at work or home. The fact that a person cannot demonstrate a particular skill, 
such as playing the piano, is not an issue before the tribunal, even if it is considering a 
claim by a musician.” (p.309) 
 
 The EA 2010's focus on the concept of “normality” insidiously locates individuals 
with disabilities as socially inferior to non-disabled individuals. By its very language, the EA 
2010 unwittingly discriminates against individuals with disabilities. The definition employed 
is couched in a comparative manner, which advances the concept of the able-bodied being as 
“normal”. Disability is identified by reference to unfavourable deviance from the able bodied 
(Woodhams & Corby, 2003). Disabled individuals stray from this concept of normality – 
they are abnormal, unable to undertake “normal” day-to-day activities and are in need of help 
and support.  
 The adoption of the medical model as the primary definition of disability by the EA 
2010 is thus controversial. Indeed, the medical model itself has been subject to substantial 
criticism by individuals with disabilities. Many individuals with disabilities contend that it is, 
in fact, society which disables physically impaired people as: "Disability is something 
imposed on top of our impairments by the way which we are unnecessarily isolated and 
excluded from full participation in society" (UPIAS, 1976, p 14).  
 To combat this, the use of a social model of disability has been advocated. According 
to the social model, disability is any societal factor imposing restrictions on disabled people. 
These can range from individual prejudice to institutional discrimination and from 
inaccessible public buildings to inaccessible transport systems (Oliver, 1996).  
 Curiously in certain limited circumstances the EA 2010 in common with the earlier 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995, favours the adoption of the social model of disability. 
Thus, where the impairment consists of a severe disfigurement, it is deemed to have a 
substantial adverse effect on the person's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities 
(Schedule 1, paragraph 3). Again with HIV, there appears to be use of the social model. Thus, 
paragraph 6 to Schedule 1 of the EA 2010: 
 
“(1) Cancer, HIV infection and multiple sclerosis are each a disability. 
(2) HIV infection is infection by a virus capable of causing the Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome.” 
 
 Within Western societies HIV fits more comfortably within the social model 
(McTigue, 2015). Although HIV damages the immune system, leaving the infected person 
vulnerable to a variety of infections (called "opportunistic" infections to indicate that they 
arise in the setting of immune impairment). However, having HIV does not mean that an 
individual has AIDS and with early HIV diagnosis and access to effective treatment, most 
PLHA will never progress to a diagnosis of AIDS. Indeed, evidence now indicates that due to 
improved treatment options PLHA can be expected to live into their early seventies, a life 
expectancy approaching that of the general population (Samji et al., 2013; Sterne, 2005). 
Despite this high levels of stigma persist towards PLHA. 
 Conyers, Boomer and McMahon (2005) assert that two main theories assist us in 
explaining the unique level of discrimination and stigma directed at PLHA. The first centres 
on the characteristics of the virus itself, with significant focus placed upon the fact that it is 
currently a potentially fatal infectious disease with no cure. The second relates to the 
marginalized nature of the vast majority of PLHA (e.g., their status as intravenous drug users, 
men who have sex with men or members of ethnic minorities). Evidence reveals that 
discrimination against PLHA is often related to pre-existing stigma making PLHA 
particularly vulnerable to discrimination (Watt, 1996). The virus is thus socially disabling and 
the fear of stigma often prevents PLHA from accessing full legal protection by, for example 
failing to disclose their condition to their employer. 
 In light of the above PLHA are deemed to be “disabled” for the purposes of the EA 
2010 and obviated from the need to meet the definition of disability in section 6. Significantly, 
obesity is not specifically identified as a disabling condition within the EA 2010 and so a 
significant barrier to obese people wishing to pursue is the requirement to show that their 
condition constitutes a disability for the purposes of section 6. The definition provided at 
section 6 serves as a gatekeeper and only grants access to the full protection of disability 
discrimination law to those people it classifies as being or having been disabled (Lawson, 
2011). Obese claimants thus must show an impairment that has 'a substantial and long-term 
adverse effect on their ability to undertake normal day-to-day activities’.   
 Recent UK rulings provide some insight to the changing approach to disability 
discrimination and obesity. For example, the UK legal ruling in Walker v Sita Information 
Networking Computing Ltd (2013) held that an obese employee suffering from a variety of 
physical and mental ailments was protected by the EA 2010 under UK laws. In Walker the 
claimant suffered conditions including dyslexia, diabetes, knee problems, high blood pressure, 
bowel and stomach complaints, anxiety and depression, coughs, and other more minor 
difficulties such as joint pains. In addition to health concerns associated with obesity, Walker 
was also diagnosed with ‘functional overlay’ recognised as a multiplicity of symptoms 
presenting in the patient. The original Employment Tribunal (ET) considered whether in total 
Mr. Walker's multiple conditions constituted ‘impairments’ for the purposes of the definition 
of disability under the EA 2010. These medical conditions affected Mr Walker’s normal 
activities, but significant issues arose with the definitions of ‘functional overlay’ within the 
current legal definition of discrimination found in the EA 2010.  
 At the first hearing (ET), it was decided that Mr. Walker was not disabled within the 
meaning of section 6 EA 2010 because there were no significant physical or organic cause for 
his symptoms. However, on appeal, the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) ruled 
differently that medical definitions and labels cannot always be relied on to promote 
sustainable legal rulings. The EAT held that a claimant's disability could result from a 
physical impairment, a mental impairment or a combination of the two. Importantly, the EAT 
stressed that the obesity on its own does not render a claimant disabled, but significantly, it 
can increase the probability that the claimant is disabled for the purposes of disability 
discrimination laws. In the words of Langstaff J: 
 
“I do not accept that obesity renders a person disabled of itself, it may make it more 
likely that someone is disabled. Therefore on an evidential basis it may permit a 
Tribunal more readily to conclude that the individual before them does indeed suffer 
from an impairment or, for that matter, a condition such as diabetes, if that diabetes is 
such as to have a substantial effect upon normal day to day activities.” (at paragraph 
18). 
 
 Therefore, an obese person cannot be regarded as disabled simply because of obesity 
per se but the associated health problems of obesity increase the possibility that an obese 
individual may satisfy the definition of disability contained at section 6 of the EA 2010.  
 Langstaff J also emphasised that in determining whether an individual is disabled for 
the purposes of the EA 2010, the correct consideration is whether the individual has an 
impairment and not the cause of the impairment. This is aligned with the approach taken 
towards alcoholism. The EA 2010 (Disability) Regulations 2010 (S.I. 2010/2128) provide 
that an addiction or dependency to alcohol, nicotine or any other substance does not 
constitute an impairment for the purposes of the EA 2010. However, this exclusion does not 
have the effect of preventing a complainant from relying on an impairment that was caused 
by an addiction. Therefore, cirrhosis of the liver could be considered an impairment even if it 
arose from alcoholism. 
 At EU level, protection from discrimination on the grounds of disability is more 
restricted in scope due to the fact that the relevant Directive, the Employment Equality 
Directive 2000/78/EC (2000) (the Framework Directive), only provides protection against 
discrimination in the fields of employment, occupation and vocational training. By way of 
contrast the EA 2010 provides protection in education, employment, premises, transport the 
provision services and public functions. The Framework Directive is expressly designed to 
“foster a labour market favourable to social integration” by “combatting discrimination 
against groups such as persons with disability,” (at Recital 8) and Article 2(1) provides:  
 
“For the purposes of this Directive, the principle of equal treatment shall mean that 
there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds 
referred to in Article 1.”  
 
 The grounds referred to in Article 1 are religion or belief, disability, age and sexual 
orientation. The Framework Directive provides no definition of disability. This has the 
potential to permit multiple varying definitions of disability to be adopted across EU member 
states and for different domestic courts to adopt differing approaches as to whether a 
particular impairment constitutes a “disability”. For example, PLHA are not automatically 
deemed to be disabled for the purposes of the Framework Directive and thus, in the absence 
of any relevant domestic legal protection, PLHA in member states other than the UK may fail 
to be regarded as disabled. Correspondingly, obesity discrimination, has not received 
significant attention within the EU with obese people receiving limited legal protection to 
date (Damamme, 2015), although some member states do afford protection on the grounds of 
physical appearance. 
 
Emerging decisions of the CJEU 
 In the seminal case of Chacon Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA (2006) the CJEU 
offered guidance on the issue of how to define “disability” for the purposes of the Framework 
Directive stating at paragraph 43 that:  
 
“[The Framework Directive] aims to combat certain types of discrimination as regards 
employment and occupation. In that context, the concept of ‘disability’ must be 
understood as referring to a limitation which results in particular from physical, 
mental or psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of the 
person concerned in professional life.”  
 
 In addition, the CJEU held that workers do not fall within the scope of the protection 
afforded by the Framework Directive as soon as they develop any type of sickness and so 
made an important distinction between sickness and disability. It was against this backdrop 
that the judgment in the case of HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge, 2013) was delivered 
by the CJEU. In HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge, 2013), Danish legislation permitted 
businesses to dismiss those who had been off ill for a certain number of days with only one 
month's notice; shorter than the notice normally required under Danish employment law. The 
case was brought by two applicants one of whom, Ms. Ring, had developed back pain. The 
second applicant, Ms. Werge, had whiplash following a road accident. Crucially, both 
applicants were still able to work but were unable to work on a fulltime basis. The applicants 
argued that they had a disability, and that this reduced notice period was unlawful disability 
discrimination, in breach of the EU Framework Directive. A question of fundamental 
importance was whether or not they fell within the definition of disability as expounded by 
the Chacon Navas case. The employers disputed that the applicants’ state of health was 
covered by the concept of “disability” within the meaning of the Framework Directive, since 
the only incapacity that affected them was that they were now not able to work full-time. As 
such it was argued by the employers that as they could work part-time they were not excluded 
completely from participating in professional life and so fell outside the Chacon Navas 
definition. The employer’s central argument was that disability, as constructed by the 
decision in Chacon Navas, implies a complete exclusion from work or professional life as 
opposed to the partial exclusion here.  
 The CJEU disagreed and placed strong emphasis on the United Nations (UN) 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the UN Convention) adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in December 2006, following prolonged lobbying by disability rights 
activists. It was ratified by the EU in 2010. The ratification of the UN Convention by the EU 
thus followed the Chacon Navas decision and accordingly it clearly follows from Article 
216(2) TFEU that international agreements concluded by the EU are binding on the 
institutions of the EU and on its Member States. Thus, the concept of disability within the 
meaning of the Framework Directive should not fall short of the scope of the protection 
afforded by the UN Convention which itself does not include a definition of "disability" or 
"persons with disabilities". However, the Convention's preamble recognizes that "disability is 
an evolving concept and that disability results from the interaction between persons with 
impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others". Article 1 of the UN Convention further 
states:  
 "Persons with disabilities include those who have long term physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may 
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others." 
 
 Yet the due to the progressive nature of the disease it is questionable whether PLHA 
will fulfil the CJEU’s conceptual requirement of “disability” formulated in HK Danmark 
(Ring and Skouboe Werge, 2013). If a purely functional approach to the question of 
“participation in professional life” is taken, then the majority of PLHA face no functional or 
imitational barriers to participation in professional life. HIV damages the immune system, 
leaving an infected person vulnerable to a variety of infections yet having HIV does not mean 
that an individual has AIDS and importantly, with early HIV diagnosis and access to 
effective treatment most PLHA will never progress to a diagnosis of AIDS. Thus advances in 
medical treatment mean that HIV is now manageable as a chronic disease in patients who 
have access to medication and who manage to suppress their viral load (Pelella, Delany, 
Moorman, Loveless, Furhrer Satten et al., 1998). Yet whilst recent advances in treatment 
have prompted a biomedical normalisation of HIV as a manageable chronic condition, social 
normalisation of the virus has not progressed in tandem (Murphy et al., 2015). Thus, HIV is 
still associated with discrimination, isolation, and marginalisation (Rodkjaer, Sodemann, 
Ostergaard, & Lomborg, 2011; Smit et al., 2012), which inevitably leads to high levels of 
stigma being directed towards PLHA. This stigma impacts significantly on the lives of PLHA. 
It often results in discrimination, exclusion, and disempowerment (Gilmore & Somerville, 
1994), leading people with HIV infection to self and societally imposed withdrawal and 
isolation (Barrett, 1995; Crandall & Coleman, 1992; Longo, Sprose, & Locke, 1990). 
 No cases are reported involving the issue of PLHA before the CJEU in order to 
definitely address this issue. By contrast the issue of whether obese individuals could fall 
within the scope of the protection afforded to individuals with disabilities by the Framework 
Directive was considered by the court in the case of Kaltoft (Fag og Arbejde, 2014). Mr 
Kaltoft had worked for fifteen years as a child-minder for the Danish municipality of Billund. 
He was responsible for taking care of people’s children in their own homes. He was 
dismissed in November 2010 following an official dismissal hearing during which his obesity 
was mentioned. Before the national court, Mr Kaltoft asserted that he was discriminated on 
the grounds of his obesity. Against this background, the national court referred several 
questions for a preliminary ruling, asking notably whether obesity can fall within the 
definition of disability for the purposes of the Framework Directive. Advocate General 
Jääskinen appeared supportive of such an idea and expressly referred to the concept of body 
mass index (BMI). BMI is a formula that consists in dividing an individual’s weight (in 
kilogrammes) by square of his/her height (in metres). The World Health Organisation (WHO, 
2015) ranks obesity into three classes by reference to the BMI. Persons with a BMI of 30.00 
to 34.99 are obese class I, persons with a BMI of 35.00 to 39.99 are obese class II, and 
persons with a BMI in excess of 40.00 are obese class III, which is sometimes referred to as 
severe, extreme or morbid obesity. 
 In Advocate General Jääskinen’s opinion, obesity might amount to a disability when 
it reaches the point where it clearly hinders an individual’s full participation in professional 
life on an equal footing with others. In his opinion, “most probably only WHO class III 
obesity, that is severe, extreme or morbid obesity, will create limitations, such as problems in 
mobility, endurance and mood, that amount to a ‘disability’ for the purposes of Directive 
2000/78” (at paragraph 56). This appeared to suggest that obese people within class III would 
be regarded as disabled for the purposes of the Framework Directive. However, this argument 
was rejected by the CJEU. In the Court’s opinion obesity does not, in itself, constitute a 
‘disability’ within the meaning of the Framework Directive (See Ferris & Marson, 2014 for 
detailed commentary on the Advocate General's opinion). This is not to say that obese 
individuals can never acquire protection as individuals with disabilities under the Framework 
Directive. Thus as acknowledged by the Court at paragraph 59: 
 
“[I]n the event that, under given circumstances, the obesity of the worker concerned 
entails a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological 
impairments that in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effective 
participation of that person in professional life on an equal basis with other workers, 
and the limitation is a long-term one, obesity can be covered by the concept of 
‘disability’ within the meaning of Directive 2000/78 (see, to that effect, judgment in 
HK Danmark, EU:C:2013:222, paragraph 41).” 
 
 It is suggested that when obesity reaches the point where it manifests itself as a 
physical, mental or psychological impairment, then it may constitute a disability. Such 
impairment must, however, hinder the effective participation of an obese individual in 
professional life on a long-term basis. Finally, the origin of an individual’s disability is 
irrelevant as is the fact that an individual may have contributed to the onset of their disability. 
Thus, as obesity substantially increases the risk of numerous impairments including for 
example hypertension (Stamler, Stamler, Riedlinger, Algera, & Roberts
 
, 1978; Criqui, 
Mebane, Wallace, Heiss, & Holdbrook, 1982; Dyer & Elliott, 1989), type 2 diabetes 
(Westlund K, Nicolaysen, 1972; Lew E A, Garfinkel, 1979; Larsson B, Bjorntorp P, Tibblin 
1981), strokes (Hubert, Feinleib, McNamara, Castelli, 1983;
 
Walker, Rimm, Ascherio, 
Kawachi, Stampfer, & Willett
 
, 1996), osteoarthritis (Cicuttini, Baker, & Spector, 1996;
 
Hochberg, Lethbridge-Cejku, Scott Jr, Reichle, Plato, & Tobin
 
, 1995), sleep apnea and 
respiratory problems (Millman, Carlisle, McGarvey, Eveloff, & Levinson, 1995
; 
Young, Palta, 
Dempsey, Skatrud, Weber, & Badr, 1993; Shephard, 1992), it is, we suggest, axiomatic that 
there is a greater probability that obese people will be disabled when compared to non-obese 
people. 
 The longer term implications of Kaltoft remain uncertain since it confirms that whilst 
obesity may be the underlying cause of disability, obesity per se is not a disability for the 
purposes of EU law. It is also unclear to what extent Kaltoft represents a possible 
modification of the social model for the purposes of EU law. When discussing whether obese 
individuals could theoretically satisfy the requirements of the Framework Directive the CJEU 
provided the following guidance at paragraph 60: 
 
“Such would be the case, in particular, if the obesity of the worker hindered his full 
and effective participation in professional life on an equal basis with other workers on 
account of reduced mobility or the onset, in that person, of medical conditions 
preventing him from carrying out his work or causing discomfort when carrying out 
his professional activity.” 
 
 Whilst post the ratification of the UN Convention, the CJEU have referred to the 
social model of disability in subsequent cases concerning disability and the Framework 
Directive (for example see HK Danmark, 2013; Z. v A Government Department and The 
Board of Management of a Community School, 2013; Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern, 2014; Fag 
og Arbejde, 2014), these comments appear to place undue emphasis on the functional 
limitations that obese people might experience in their participation in professional life. Thus, 
the above quote solely refers to the fact that their participation might be hindered due to 
functional factors like “reduced mobility” or “medical conditions preventing him from 
carrying out his work or causing discomfort when carrying out professional activity.” There 
is no explicit reference to attitudinal or other societal factors that may prevent obese people 
from participating in professional life. This is quite possibly an oversight yet there remains 
the distinct possibility that the CJEU is at the early stages of developing the social model 
whilst attempting to retain components of the medical model (i.e., there must be at least some 
element of functional impairment). Indeed, such an approach was alluded to by the opinion of 
the Advocate General in the HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge) case. At paragraph 34 
it was stated by the Advocate General that: 
 
“34. The distinction between sickness and disability is therefore easier to draw in 
these cases than in the case on which the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America had to rule, where it held that even an asymptomatic HIV infection may 
constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA 1990. 
 
35. There is nothing in the wording of Directive 2000/78 to indicate that its scope of 
application is limited to a certain degree of severity of disability. Since, however, this 
issue has been neither raised by the referring court nor discussed by the parties to the 
proceedings, it does not need to be definitively resolved here.” 
 
 With these facts in mind, it must be questioned whether PLHA or obese people will 
fall within the definition of “disability” advanced by the CJEU for the purposes of the 
Framework Directive in HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge). It may be perceived as 
somewhat troubling as to why it was questioned whether a certain degree of severity of 
disability is required for the purposes of the Framework Directive. These comments could, 
especially when coupled with a reference to asymptomatic HIV, appear to place undue 
influence on the medical model of disability by possibly focusing on an individual’s 
functional limitations as opposed to the attitudinal barriers they might encounter which 
hinder them from full and effective participation in professional life. It is submitted that 
caution should be exercised in the interpretation of these passages and that, given the 
explicit references to the social model in its recent decisions, the direction of travel of the 
CJEU does still very much appear to favour the use of the social model of disability. Yet 
what lessons, if any, can be learnt from attitudinal theory that might assist in a more 
favourable implementation of the social model of disability in law. It is to this issue that this 
article will now turn. 
 
Implications of the UK and EU Legal Framework and Potential Interventions 
 Studies have highlighted the increasing instances of obesity discrimination in various 
spheres of life such as in the workplace, at home, in education and in healthcare (e.g., Flint et 
al., 2016; Puhl & Brownell, 2001). Yet for the purposes of the law of the UK, there remains 
the distinct possibility that a PLHA and an obese person individual subjected to the same 
discriminatory act could experience a difference in the outcomes of their respective legal 
cases. This is due to the different protection afforded to PLHA and obese people. The 
automatic protection that PLHA receive under the disability provisions of the EA 2010 means 
that arguments as to the interpretation and application of the definition of disability have no 
impact on the admissibility of their case. They are automatically deemed to be disabled and 
thus entitled to advance a claim of disability discrimination. Conversely, if an obese person is 
to advance their claim of disability discrimination under the EA 2010 the first hurdle they 
must clear is satisfying the court or tribunal that they fall within the definition of disability in 
the EA 2010 and are consequently “disabled” for the purposes of the law. If they are unable 
to demonstrate that they fall within the parameters of this definition, their claim goes no 
further.  
 Some research has examined whether legal protection for obesity discrimination 
would be publically supported. For example, Puhl et al. (2015) examined possible public 
support for legislation to prohibit obesity discrimination in the US, Canada, Australia and 
Iceland, reporting that the public would endorse measures to prevent obesity discrimination 
in employment. They reported that approximately two thirds of participants were in favour of 
legislation that would prohibit employers from not hiring, paying lower wages, denying 
promotion, and ending employment based on the body weight. Previous research (e.g., 
Schulte et al. (2007) examining obesity discrimination in employment has demonstrated that 
obese employees receive lower starting salaries, are ranked as less qualified, and work longer 
hours than normal weight employees. Puhl et al. (2015) also reported that the public support 
for legislation prohibiting obesity discrimination was associated with controllability beliefs 
where more awareness of uncontrollable causes of obesity was associated with stronger 
support for laws. They also found that the greatest support for these laws was from women 
and people with higher body weight, which it might be argued is expected given that there are 
reports suggesting obesity discrimination is stronger for obese females than obese males (e.g., 
Flint et al., 2016).  
 At the EU level, the ratification of the UN Convention by the EU is to be warmly 
welcomed. Yet given the comments by the CJEU in recent decisions like HK Danmark (Ring 
and Skouboe Werge) and Kaltoft it appears that both PLHA and obese people who seek to 
rely on protection from discrimination using the terms of the Framework Directive may face 
an uphill battle in persuading the court that they are disabled for the purposes of the law. In 
Kaltoft the CJEU made no mention to the possible social and/or attitudinal barriers that might 
hinder the full and effective participation of obese people in professional life. Rather the 
Court emphasised the functional effects that obesity could have like reduced mobility or the 
onset of medical conditions that prevent work or cause discomfort. Nothing was said by the 
CJEU about the possible stigma that obese people might face from their fellow workers and 
the extent to which this might hinder their full and effective participation in professional life. 
Similarly, in HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge), the comments made by the Advocate 
General regarding PLHA appear to place undue influence on the medical model of disability 
by focusing on an individual’s functional limitations as opposed to the stigma they might 
encounter in their professional life. In future decisions, the CJEU must recognize that the 
barriers which hinder the full and effective participation of disabled people in professional 
life go beyond just the environmental or physical but include attitudinal and psychological 
barriers. As such it must be hoped that a definition of disability which is firmly grounded in 
the social model and recognises the effects of stigma is developed in future CJEU decisions.  
 Academic and policy discussions of stigma often concentrate on Goffman’s work 
(Goffman, 1963). Goffman’s research draws upon the experience of people suffering from 
mental illness, possessing physical deformities, or practicing what were perceived to be 
socially deviant behaviours such as homosexuality or criminal behaviour and defines stigma 
as ‘‘an attribute that is significantly discrediting’’ (p.3) and which serves to reduce social 
standing of the person who possesses it. He identifies three bases of stigma. First, 
abominations of the body. Second, blemishes of individual character and third tribal stigma, 
due to an individual’s membership of a despised group in society. Watt (1996) advances that 
stigmatization of individuals with HIV rests upon all three of Goffman’s bases and 
consequently stigma is more pronounced. Whilst it is arguable that stigma amongst obese 
people is less pronounced than that against PLHA, it still has the potential to manifest itself in 
discrimination against obese individuals (Flint et al., 2016). 
 A concept, rooted in the social model, that might assist the protection of both PLHA 
and obese people at EU level would be for the CJEU to consider the development of 
protection for individuals based upon the fact that an individual’s impairment hinders their 
full and effective participation in professional life on an equal basis with other workers as a 
result of other workers’ attitudes towards their impairment (See Damamme (2015) for a 
discussion regarding the position of U.S. law on this point
 
). The obese person would still 
need to show that their obesity had manifested itself as an impairment. In addition, for both 
obese people and PLHA the limitation sustained must be long-term. This would further 
embed the social model of disability into EU law and was indeed the approach taken by the 
European Court of Human Rights in I.B. v. Greece, Application no. 552/10. Whilst the 
European Court of Human Rights is not a court of the EU, the CJEU cites and pays close 
attention to its decisions. There has also been a desire on the part of both Courts to avoid 
conflict and demonstrate a degree of deference towards each other on similar questions 
arising before them (Pâris-Bobozy, 2014, Craig and De Búrca, 2015). 
 In I.B. v. Greece applicant, I.B., was a Greek national who had been working since 
2001 in a company which manufactured jewellery. In January 2005 he confided to three of 
his fellow employees that he was afraid he had contracted HIV. These three colleagues then 
wrote a letter to the director of the company stating that I.B. had AIDS and that the company 
ought to dismiss him. Following this information about I.B.’s health began to circulate 
around the company and I.B. stated that he was stigmatised by his fellow employees and 
treated like a pariah. On 10th February I.B. tested positive for HIV and the employer invited 
an occupational health doctor to come speak to the employees, to reassure them that there 
was no risk whatsoever to their own health. Despite this on 21st February, 33 of I.B.’s fellow 
employees sent a letter to the director of the company demanding his dismissal in order “to 
safeguard their health and their right to work” (para. 10). Two days later, I.B. was dismissed 
by the company. 
 The first national Court held that I.B.’s dismissal was illegal. The Court of Appeal 
also held that his dismissal was illegal. However, the Greek Court of Cassation quashed that 
judgment deciding that his termination was justified in order to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the company and harmonious relations within it. Subsequently, I.B. 
complained to the European Court of Human Rights that his dismissal violated his right to a 
private life under Article 8 in conjunction with the prohibition of discrimination under Article 
14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 The European Court of Human Rights decided that Article 8 was engaged as I.B.’s 
dismissal and the stigma to which he had been subjected, was bound to have serious 
repercussions for his private life. The Court also stressed that when vulnerable groups like 
PLHA, were treated differently, States would only be afforded a very narrow margin of 
appreciation. Here, the treatment of I.B. fell outside that margin of appreciation and 
accordingly his human rights had been breached. Although no explicit reference was made to 
the UN Convention, the Court very much adopted the social model of disability approach. 
This can be seen from the wording used in paragraph 80: 
 
“People with HIV are forced to face multiple problems, not only medical but also 
professional, social, personal and psychological problems, and sometimes entrenched 
prejudices even amongst the well-educated.” (translated from the French original). 
 
 Obese people also face entrenched prejudices. As previously mentioned, previous 
research (e.g. Flint, Hudson & Lavallee, 2015) has demonstrated that obesity stigma is 
evident in diverse population groups measured on both a conscious and unconscious level 
and obesity stigma has been reported in various settings such as schools, healthcare and 
workplaces (Flint, 2015; Flint & Snook, 2014; Flint et al., 2016). 
 Yet the law can only do so much to address stigma and discrimination. The potential 
for discrimination to occur and impact decisions, attitudes and behaviours calls for 
interventions at all levels. Interventions at Government, in the workplace and schools to 
prohibit HIV and obesity discrimination are warranted, as are interventions to modify 
stigmatising attitudes. Previous research (e.g., O'Brien et al., 2010) has demonstrated that 
educational intervention that aim to increase knowledge of uncontrollable causes, can reduce 
stigma towards population groups of that characteristic. This is in line with Attribution 
Theory (Weiner, 1995) which indicates that by increasing people's understanding of 
uncontrollable causes, a subsequent reduction in negative attitudes towards a stigmatised 
group can occur. 
 Given the influence of the media on attitude formation and subsequent behaviours, 
intervention is warranted to develop guidelines relating to non-stigmatising and 
discriminatory behaviours. The formation of attitudes and behaviours are linked to exposure 
to societal messages. The media are a pervasive and persuasive source that contributes to the 
formation of attitudes towards PLHA and obese people. Thus, it is imperative that the media 
adhere to non-stereotypical portrayal and by doing so, reduce the influence of the media in 
stigma development. Guidance for non-stereotypical portrayal has been observed in relation 
to UK national newspapers, where the Society for Professional Journalists (2010) stated that 
journalists should “avoid stereotyping by race, gender, age, religion, ethnicity, geography, 
sexual orientation, disability, physical appearance or social status” (p. 1). Despite this, Flint et 
al. (2016) reported that UK journalists do not adhere to this guidance and there appears to be 
little reprimand and therefore deterrent for non-adherence. Inaccurate and sensationalist 
reporting of matters relating to HIV and obesity contribute to stigma and discrimination and 
examples in relation to PLHA include headlining HIV as a cause for serious concern in 
stories where its relevance is at best tenuous (Wells, 2011) or in criminal cases of reckless 
HIV transmission where the language used goes beyond criticism of the accused to imply an 
association of evil or criminality in all PLHA e.g. 'HIV monster (Taylor, 2011) and 'Evil HIV 
beast took my babies away from me (Cameron, 2010). Obese individuals are also subjected to 
media criticism with headlines resembling “'We're sick of fat people whingeing'(Kippist, 
2013), “This Christmas give a fat person you know the greatest gift of all - some brutal 




 This article has highlighted the prevalence of stigma and discrimination towards 
PLHA and obese persons. When faced with such discrimination PLHA and obese persons 
often seek legal protection by utilising the protected characteristic of disability with varying 
degrees of success. By way of example, within the UK, PLHA face greater legal protection 
under the law due to their designation as "disabled" for the purposes of the EA 2010. 
Conversely, obese people are not automatically deemed disabled for the purposes of the law 
and must instead demonstrate that they fall within the EA 2010's definition of disability. 
 At the EU level, the CJEU signalled its willingness to adopt the social model of 
disability in the case of HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge). Despite this, comments in 
relation to PLHA by the Advocate General in HK Danmark and the decision in relation to 
obese persons in Kaltoft appear to suggest that the Court is not yet willing to fully embrace 
the social model of disability. There is the possibility that the Court is placing undue 
influence on functional limitations when assessing whether individuals satisfy the definition 
of disability expounded by the Framework Directive. This approach potentially fails to 
acknowledge the societal stigma that PLHA and obese persons may encounter. To address 
this position and align the concept of disability at EU level more fully with the social model, 
it is respectfully submitted that future decisions of the CJEU could develop protection for 
individuals based on the fact that their impairment hinders their full and effective 
participation in professional life on an equal basis with others as a result of other workers' 
attitudes towards their impairment. This would further embed the social model of disability 
into EU law and has the potential to afford greater protection for individuals who are often 
stigmatised by society. 
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